The original tenor of pleas for more helicopters in Afghanistan gave me the impression that the idea – at the political level - was to abandon the roads altogether and just kind of fly about until Obama decided to pull the plug and we could all go home. I stand corrected, though I still think there’s a lot of the politics of the decent interval in this controversy. I don’t think “equip them properly or withdraw them” is a question actually being considered by any serious politician, as seriousness is generally understood in politics. We’re in Afghanistan because the US is there and we’ll go the moment the US goes, or maybe a bit earlier if the situation calms down enough. The issues of casualties and equipment have to be managed in a way that doesn’t threaten the primacy of the Anglo-American relationship by triggering a “premature” withdrawal by British forces. As I think I mentioned earlier discussion of these issues tend to substitute for discussion of the war itself and the political relationships underpinning it.
Ideally, if this is your objective then you make the appropriate preparations. In practice, it seems to mean that you don’t think much at all about what a military deployment actually might involve. John Reid said back before the original Helmand deployment that he anticipated it would go off without a single shot being fired. Since then, there’s been constant combat. Every year, huge Taliban losses are reported , but every year when fighting season rolls around they seem to be able to put more men in the field and also seem to have enough survivors of the last round of combat to have learned to fight more effectively, or at least, in this case, to build bigger roadside bombs.
Question: do we have, after all this time, something approximating to a Taliban order of battle? Did we know before we embarked on the current Helmand deployment how many of them we would be facing, how they were composed and what they were armed with? It doesn’t seem like it. One year, British forces pile in and discover that the Taliban can knock out their vehicles. So the government scrapes around looking for more heavily armoured transport. Next year, those get knocked out and more soldiers die. So it’s discovered that we need more helicopters, like the Americans.
But the US doesn’t have helicopters for Afghanistan. It has them as part of a wide ranging – basically, global - expeditionary capability. We could theoretically do the same on a smaller scale. It would mean more deaths and more combat in places where it’s hard to convince the public that we have any warlike business. It would be vastly expensive, especially when you consider the sheer waste of the procurement process. And we couldn’t do it to the point where we could sustain large scale combat without being part of a wider mission. Since most NATO countries aren’t interested in this, that would mean making a vast human and financial commitment to build forces whose deployment would be effectively decided in the White House, whoever happened to be occupying it at the time.
We’re fighting them in Paraguay so we don’t have to fight them over here. This does not strike me as a popular policy. It might be the thing that actually breaks the Anglo-American relationship. So maybe in the circumstances it just seems, for the government, that it’s better not to ask too many questions on any level, whether about the capabilities of our current antagonists or about what we want the British army to be for. Just make the commitment and keep your fingers crossed about the casualties.
The Tories? I don’t know, but I suspect that, if they thought they could afford it, an open ended, fully equipped sepoy commitment might have a certain appeal. What else does David Cameron have to offer United Statespersons to make them think of him as special? One thing I do believe is that current Tory criticisms are being made in the full knowledge that whatever the casualty levels or equipment shortcomings the government won’t withdraw the troops. The road back from Kabul leads through Washington DC and in the absence of a complete reorientation of British foreign policy neither party will go that route.
Recent Comments