The Beeb, from Thusrday last:
Chinese security forces have shot and killed a young Tibetan man in Sichuan province, Tibetan campaign groups say.
The death in Aba prefecture would be at least the third such killing this week.
Police and troops opened fire when a crowd gathered to protect another man being sought for distributing leaflets in Aba, the Free Tibet group said.
That’s three confirmed dead over the past week in Aba and other Tibetan parts of Sichuan. The background goes something like this.
Aba prefecture as been under continuous lockdown since the Tibetan uprising of March 08. Most of the coverage at that time focused on the protests/rioting in Lhasa; but many of the Tibetan areas in China proper (formerly Amdo and Kham, covering Qinghai and Gansu provinces and parts of Sichuan and Yunnan) were in revolt. And while security has been relaxed in the Tibetan SAR, apart from the annual restrictions on travel in and out that coincide with the anniversary of the March 9 uprising, it seems to have become a permanent feature of life in many Tibetan parts of China.
Aba, where the most recent protest took place, has become the locus of both repression and protest. The prefecture has been under lockdown since it took part in the 2008 uprising (or the 3/14 incident, as it’s known in China), with an especial focus on the Kirti monastery. Most of the monks there, who once numbered in the low thousands, have been sent away, while the rest have been subjected to intense and constant pressure to denounce the DL, profess loyalty to Beijing and so on.
Early last year, we began to see the response: monks and nuns from Kirti began self-immolating, and have continued to do so at irregular intervals to the present day. There have been 17 so far, ten from Kirti, and all but one from Tibetan areas of China rather than Tibet proper. Most have ended in death, an outcome more or less guaranteed by the practice of actually drinking petrol rather than just dousing themselves with it before setting themselves alight. If that's gesture poltics, it's one hell of a gesture.
The self-immolations have been ascribed to despair which overcomes Tibetan Buddhist precepts against violence to the self, which is hard to contest. But it’s despair with a plan, or at least despair with some tactical awareness. As you can see from this timeline, most of the self-immolators performed the act in public and populated places, sometimes accompanied it with literature, and nearly always with public declarations for the return of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan independence. This is clearly intended to generate both a local response (in terms of protest) and a global one (in terms of publicity and moral example).
The global response, apart from the odd bout of publicity, hasn’t really come. We’ve been a bit protested-out this past year. And anyway, who remembers Norman Morrison these days? Over much of the past year, local responses were rapidly snuffed out by the presence of security personnel, complete with fire extinguishers. It’s that which has changed over the past week or so. Either a static number of local Tibetans are angry enough to protest in the face of armed PAP units, or more are prepared to rally, changing the physical balance of power. And the way in which those demonstrations are put down seems to generate more of them. So the ball is rolling.
Beijing, as ever, has identified the Dalai as the Black Hand behind the whole thing. This is more obviously nonsense than usual. The DL has said consistently that he opposes this form of protest, though he blames China for driving the local Tibetan clergy to these lengths. To my mind this is confirmed by the fact that he hasn’t really thrown his influence behind making the self-immolations much bigger global news. He remains committed to the policy of non-violent protest and negotiation designed to secure Tibetan autonomy under overall Chinese sovereignty. This is also the line pursued by the present Tibetan government in exile, which also refrains from actively condoning the self-immolations (though, like the DL, it refuses to condemn them)
I think what we’ve been seeing emerge since 2008 are the contours of post Dalai Tibetan activism. A policy which stressed moderate demands, nonviolent means and international support is changing to one which is domestically driven, moving towards active confrontation, and which looks to the DL for symbolic rather than practical leadership. A couple of points that may or may not be relevant: the Lhasa uprising of 2008 occurred partly in commemoration of the revolt of 1958, and going further back, the US-supported Tibetan guerilla campaign which followed that revolt relied on insurgents from Tibetan China rather than Tibet proper.
For the past week or so, China has been sending convoys of PAP and militia to Aba, Qiang and other flashpoints of Tibetan militancy. It’s also cut the worst affected areas off from both internet and mobile phone connectivity, to some effect. We were getting regular accounts of the latest disturbances right up until Thursday. Since then, nothing.
As of Sunday night, protest hasn’t got over the border into Tibet proper, though there are reports of families with relatives abroad being warned by the security forces to be careful what they say when they speak to them. There is also an extensive security presence in cities like Chengdu and other places outside Tibetan China which have substantial Tibetan communities. Meanwhile, Tibetan new year approaches; and after that, 3/14. We shall see.
Recent Comments