And here they are, apparently in somewhat larger numbers than the protesters.
I always worked on the assumption that Iranian elections were engineered to produce the right results from the outset through candidate selection and so on. It certainly doesn’t surprise me that fervent and nationalistic Red State Iran won. After all, fervent and nationalistic Red State America won back in 2004. But really I have no idea whether these elections were bent. I just read the papers.
It reminded me a bit of the elections in Lebanon, in which widespread and extensive disbursements of cash by the Saudis were public knowledge. But because our side can’t be seen to be buying votes, the vague consensus was for an opposition win. And of course, as Alex points out, that’s a particular issue in the UK where Saudi money does influence decisions made by the political and criminal justice systems. Anyway, it turns out that the House of Sordid got what it pays for. But no, it seems that an angel called Obama descended from on high and changed the hearts of the Lebanese people, in the form of his John the Baptist, Joe Biden.
I don’t suppose there’s much point in complaining. Stuff like this does at least tell you what the lumpencommentariat want back here in Absurdistan. But this is undoubtedly the most extravagent attempt at wish fulfilment since the Georgian fiasco last year.
It's a hard call isn't it? On the one hand, I find myself inclined to believe that there was jiggerypokery for the reasons Juan Cole sets out - Mousavi apparently lost his own home town 75 to 25 and so on. On the other hand, the shock and rage reminds me sooooo much of the reaction of the antichavistas to losing their recall referendum.
Posted by: dsquared | June 14, 2009 at 05:41 PM
I'm not sure Michael Howard had much of a personal vote in llaneli last time out. "favourite son" really doesn;t tell you much of itself.
Posted by: jamie | June 14, 2009 at 05:58 PM
Yeah, but people don't normally do this stuff for no reason, do they?
Posted by: ejh | June 14, 2009 at 06:21 PM
It's really the huge margin when he didn't even lead in the polls, coupled with the huge turnout which should favor Moussavi which makes it implausible (not wholly implausible.)
Dagens nyheter thinks it's possible it was legit but poinsts out:
Mousavi should have won Azerbaijan province at least, he's azeri. Not just favorite son, ethnic vote.
Also, Mehdi Karroubi should have gotten disproportionate support in home province Luristan, home of the wily lurs, only got 0,85 total despite getting 17% in 05. And Rezai in Khuzestan.'
And the interior ministry announced result's today even though that's against the constitution.
Posted by: David Weman | June 14, 2009 at 09:18 PM
Here's a bit of baseless speculation: Maybe the difference w 1997 is that Ahmadinejad is the revol guard's boy, and they prodded Khamenei to okay it.
In other words, Khamenei is less powerful than people think.
Posted by: David Weman | June 14, 2009 at 09:21 PM
Er the wily lurs bit is b/c I pasted it from other website where it's an injoke.
Posted by: David Weman | June 14, 2009 at 09:22 PM
Actually the difference w 97 is more obviously that in 97 IIRC no one saw the result coming.
Posted by: David Weman | June 14, 2009 at 09:26 PM
I am in two minds completely - as I say, half of me wants to believe that as Justin says, people don't do this for no reason, but the other half can't shake the memory of the antichavistas, and notes that Juan Cole et al don't seem to note all that much that the difference between now and 2000 is precisely that Iran's spent the last ten years as the subject of more or less straight-up economic warfare. I guess I will have to wait until David Aaronovitch writes his column on Tuesday, as I know he's very good when it comes to non-conspiratorial interpretations.
Posted by: dsquared | June 14, 2009 at 10:51 PM
My baseless speculation may not have been bold enough: http://www.progressiverealist.org/blogpost/are-we-witnessing-military-coup-iran
Not a question of prodding Khamenei if true. Take with appropriate dosage of salt.
Posted by: David Weman | June 14, 2009 at 11:11 PM
coupled with the huge turnout which should favor Moussavi
I don't really see why this is the case. A big turnout can also mean successful (counter-)mobilization by the state of basically apolitical or pro-Ahmadinejad constituencies: the rural vote, the easily-bought legions of urban poor and unemployed, tribal groups, etc, and making sure that state employees & military families hauled out their wives and children and every last toothless old granny to vote. At the very least, a high turnout cuts both ways.
Posted by: alle | June 15, 2009 at 03:01 AM
It's a strange one - Iranian politics, once you manage to mouth the correct phrases and positions to get past the gatekeepers[1], always seems to have been surprisingly fair and honest (if unpleasant), so an outright fix just seems a bit out of character.
I'm trying to withhold judgment until things clear down a bit.
[1] Which is of course where the substantitive fixing to maintain the status quo takes place, of course.
Posted by: Richard J | June 15, 2009 at 01:39 PM
A data point; apparently the population is 70% urban, which puts a different spin on the "bloody middle class students, the countryside voted en masse for Iranian Bush" counter-meme.
(Meanwhile, does anyone else see the Kerry-Mousavi parallel? Both respected establishment figures, both there or thereabouts, both shoved aside by the movement. I was thinking of this doing my piece on AFOE, but I found it too depressing to write about. So I missed out on a huge predictive coup.)
Posted by: Alex | June 16, 2009 at 09:40 AM