think of danger

Remember that poll on the BBC a year or so back which found that Marx was the top bloke philosopher of all time or some such? It’s found its way to China, and an instructional DVD for party cadres:

THE 70 million members of the Chinese Communist Party have all been watching a series of eight DVDs - not Yes, Minister, but Think of Danger While Living in Safety: The Lessons From the Collapse of the Soviet Union Communist Party…

…The programs place most of the blame on Mikhail Gorbachev for "the extinction of the party, which must mean the extinction of the country" after 74 years in power. By extension, the same equation may thus be applied to China: the end of the party's rule - 57 years so far - will mean the fragmentation and collapse of the country.

The party presentation says: "Collaborating with nationalists, the so-called democrats within the party sped its split and that of the Soviet Union encouraged by concepts advocated by Gorbachev, including democratisation, openness and diversity of public opinion."

The "disastrous results" of the ensuing "shock therapy prescribed by the Americans" included a 52 per cent collapse of economic output over a decade, 5000 per cent inflation, and average life expectancy cut by four years.

The programs cite a survey by the BBC - whose website is barred in China - that made Karl Marx the leading thinker of the last millennium, followed by Albert Einstein. "This shows that many people believe we still need Marx, as natural science needs Einstein's theories."

This was strictly not for consumption by the general public in China. It is, however, compulsory viewing for cadres, who have to turn in a report on what they’ve seen (this is fairly common as a means of enforcing party discipline in China, with the result that there’s quite a thriving market in faked reports).
The Chinese public, meanwhile, has been getting an educational TV series of its own: The Rise of the Great Nations.

Its stentorian narrator and epic soundtrack present the emergence of the nine countries, from Portugal in the 15th century to the United States in the 20th, and cites numerous achievements worthy of emulation: Spain had a risk-taking queen; Britain’s nimble navy secured vital commodities overseas; the United States regulated markets and fought for national unity.

The documentary also emphasizes historical themes that coincide with policies Chinese leaders promote at home. Social stability, industrial investment, peaceful foreign relations and national unity are presented as more vital than, say, military strength, political liberalization or the rule of law. In the 90 minutes devoted to examining the rise of the United States, Lincoln is accorded a prominent part for his efforts to “preserve national unity” during the Civil War. China has made reunification with Taiwan a top national priority.

So it’s Marx for the bosses, Lincoln for the masses. The interesting thing is that the world’s last great leviathan state seems to be promoting a remarkably whiggish view of history: peace, trade, development and measured progress towards social, economic and political openness ballasted by the steady, sure, accretion of wealth and power. It could have been something by Braudel.

Sun Bin argues here that this is basically the official line of the government, and the aim is partly to curb popular nationalism by picking and choosing bits and pieces from the Western and Japanese experience that make countries strong and sustainable.

On the face of it this doesn’t make a good fit with the message the cadres are getting. But then it’s horses for courses really. The TV series is meant to promote acceptance by the public that they’re part of a kind of developmental matrix under the guidance of a wise, open and forward looking leadership, while the cadre DVD is meant to promote discipline within the party. It’s significant here that the Chinese government is relaxed enough about public opinion to permit a favourable discussion of the Glorious Revolution and the framing of the US constitution but nervous enough about the state of the Communist Party to insist on a Leninist model of discipline. It indicates a belief that the main threat to CPC rule comes from within the Party rather than from the public.

Comments

[Phil]

a belief that the main threat to CPC rule comes from within the Party rather than from the public.

This reminds me of something I read recently by some American social movement theorists, who tried to analyse Tiananmen in terms of elite interaction with popular protest & rapidly concluded that the model didn't really work - or rather it did, but not in quite the way they expected. Because of the Party's penetration of society, there isn't that much space for mass protest to develop unguided - but because of the Party's monopoly of power, there isn't that much space for intra-elite faction fighting to develop either. The result, they argued, is that mass protest is selectively exploited - and fostered - as a means of settling elite conflicts. It's a bit Kremlinological, but it persuaded me. It was published in 2001, though, and mass group incidents may have changed the picture since then.

[jamie]

I think the actual threat from within the party has more to do with colossal misrule stimulating revolt rather than different ideological orientations within the wider ruling group.

It's certainly true that a) there's a long CPC factional tradition of supporting external protest and rebellion against internal enemies, and then doing away with it when the time is right - the hundred flowers movement, democracy wall and so on. The anti-japanese riots in Shanghai not so long ago looked like an attempt by the Shanghai faction to derail Hu's policy towards Japan, which is actually quite accomodating.

...and b)this is against a background where civil society has always been suppressed by the ruling group, in Imperial times as under the communists. There's a long tradition of hostility towards any non-family or kinship grouping independent of the state.

Policy towards the MGI's seems to illustrate the first point. On those occasions where localised rebellions have been successful, central government has always let that result stand as a popular verdict. It's partky seen as an opportunity to put discipline on local cadres.

[Alex]

Fantastic post, JK.

Phil: it looked like elite interaction with popular protest to me - the elite interacted with them until they were dead, no?