prestige battle

Jason Burke:

Musa Qala has taken on massive symbolic value. It was taken by British forces last year and given over to tribal elders who had pledged to keep out the Taliban. In February, though, the agreement made among the diverse elements that currently make up the ever-shifting matrix of politics and power-broking on the ground in Afghanistan - the government, the Taliban, the various tribal leaders and the international forces - broke down. The Taliban retook the town without firing a shot a few days before the then Nato commander, General David Richards, who had strongly backed the agreement in the face of fierce criticism from US commanders and politicians, left the country.

It was worth a try, unless you’re of the notion that actual self rule has to be put off until a local administration is in place which is well to the left of the Labour government on civil liberties, in other words if it has to be put off indefinitely. Interesting account of the local political dynamic too:

When the Taliban fell, the president, Hamid Karzai, appointed loyalists within the Akhunzada sub-tribe to key positions of power locally. For three years, the other sub- tribes, the Pirzai, Ibrahimzai, and Khalozai, tried to secure a fairer redistribution of lucrative administrative posts through more or less peaceful means, largely to no avail.

The result was that, when in 2005 the ideological hardcore of the Taliban launched their offensive to retake the south and east of Afghanistan, they found large numbers of ready allies in northern Helmand.

In other words, we’ve been taking sides in an Afghan civil war. The Germans et al get criticized for not sending troops to the combat zone but it’s hard to see why any NATO member should send its people to fight for the local hegemony of the Akhunzada. Burke adds:

With this in mind, claims that the Taliban run more than 50% of Afghanistan should be treated with scepticism. Between 1998 and 2001, the Taliban repeatedly claimed to control 80% of the country. Yet to anyone who travelled extensively around the country in that period, it was clear much of that dominance was nominal, depending on the fickle allegiance of local powerbrokers, village chiefs and warlords.

All of which points to a Kilcullenization strategy: support the local against the central, the particular against the general and the feudal against the modern, except that this tends to dissolve the state rather than bind it together.

Comments

[alle]

With this [tribal, local, family side-switching] in mind, claims that the Taliban run more than 50% of Afghanistan should be treated with scepticism.

I would guess that's probably true for US and NATO troops too, no?