I think I’ll leave off Tibet, at least for a while, but this long discussion of The Tibet Question from an American perspective comes from 1995 but provides a good background on the actual policies pursued by China in Tibet at different times. This prediction of an upturn in violence seems prescient:
This kind of option would be extremely difficult for the Dalai Lama to sanction given his strong feelings about non-violence, but it may also be difficult for him to prevent. It could well occur even if he personally opposed it. His own failure to force China to moderate its policies at a time when the character of Tibet is so obviously being altered could lead other more militant Tibetans to declare his civil disobedience approach a failure and turn to more violent approaches on their own. The crux of the matter is that Tibetans are unlikely to stand on the sidelines for much longer watching Beijing transform their homeland with impunity. National-istic emotions coupled with desperation and anger make a powerful brew, and there are Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet who are intoxicated with the idea of beginning such a campaign of focused violence - in their view a "war of conscience," a Tibetan-style intifada. There are, it appears, at least two groups of exile Tibetans now actively seeking outside funding to organize and launch such activities, at least one of which is doing so in the U.S.. The real question, therefore, may not be will they, but rather when will they decide they can wait no longer to do so. Consequently, while the specter of Tibet becoming engulfed in the kind of ethnic violence found in the Middle East and North Ireland is not pleasant to contemplate, it is not all that far fetched given the current frustration and anger Tibetans feel, and their strategic need for creating powerful new leverage with Beijing.
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