Not quite. The local rents are functionally important, but thinking like Sciascia in Iraq is more than just reducing the thing to economic targets, though those are clearly the proximate spoils. It’s more that the ideas of crime, politics, religion, peace, violence, belief, cynicism, idealism and so on don’t have any kind of institutional integrity or clear distinction between them. The basic political choice available is between power and death, and all things are subordinate to getting more of the first for yourself and more of the second for your enemy. The advantage of spoils like the revenue from Basra port in this scenario is that it does both at the same time, but cherchez les dinars isn’t necessarily the point of the thing.
I interviewed Patrick Cockburn this morning about his new book on all things al-Sadr, and I’ll publish the writeup here after it’s out in print. I think the relevant takeout in re Basra and the intra-Shi’te conflicts that have broken out across Southern Iraq is that the Sadrists, as the biggest party of the biggest confessional faction are too big to be defeated, but without Hizbollah-style absolute hegemony over the wider world of political Shi’ism or effective outreach across the sectarian divide, they’re also too small to win. For their rivals in ISCI and Dawa this means that the Sadrists have to be destroyed militarily, since Sadrism is too rooted in the population to be marginalised politically.
As things stand, the Jaish also seems to be holding its own pretty well in downtown Basra. This report says that the whole offensive went off half cocked:
According to senior sources, the offensive was launched three months before Lt-Gen Mohan had wanted it to, and despite him warning that going in too early would result in the fighting spreading to other Shia strongholds. It was not the first time the general had been at odds with the Baghdad government. Mr Maliki had considered removing him from his post four weeks ago, but desisted after lobbying by the British.British commanders were unaware of the operation until just before it began, although the Iraqi government's national security adviser, Mowaffaq al-Rubaie, had spent half an hour discussing the plan with General David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq, on Saturday evening. This was followed by Mr Maliki ordering two extra Iraqi infantry battalions to Basra that night.
…Lt-Gen Mohan was appointed on a rolling three-month contract last July. According to Iraqi sources, the so-called "Iranian faction" surrounding Prime Minister Maliki would not give an 18-month contract to an avowedly secular commander in Basra. His current tenure runs out on 19 April. Mr Maliki is under pressure from those opposed to Lt-Gen Mohan to recall him to Baghdad at that time.
Lt Gen Mohan appears to be a member of the Iraq faction in Iraqi politics, which doesn’t get to decide anything. As for the British faction, it was apparently given no notice at all that the latest attack was going to take place and is now being urged to take part in the fighting. Once more, with feeling: time to go home.
Comments